www.folkkampanjen.se | Information on the European Spallation Source Project
Published in Medsols in an abbreviated Swedish
version by Charly Hulten, 29 February 2008
Controversial neutron scattering facility to be built in Lund?
By Niels Henrik Hooge
In February 2007, the Swedish government announced that it supports locating the European Spallation Source (ESS) in Lund and that it is willing to cover 30 percent of the project’s construction costs. ESS, which is projected to be world’s largest neutron scattering facility, thirty times bigger than any other currently in existence, has been under development since 1991 at the expense of at least 500 man-years. If it is built in Lund, it will be the largest research project in Scandinavian history and one of the biggest development projects ever in the Øresund region. However, the flaws that have derailed ESS in the past still exist and could bring the project to a standstill again.
Originally, five European consortia applied the developer of the ESS project, the ESS Council, for permission to host ESS. The most powerful was considered to be the Swedish-Danish-Norwegian consortium, ESS Scandinavia, which in Sweden includes among others the Municipality of Lund, Region Skåne, Lund University, Linköping University, Chalmers University of Technology, KTH - Royal Institute of Technology and in Denmark the University of Copenhagen, the Technical University of Denmark and Risø National Laboratory (1). In addition to ESS Scandinavia, there were two German site candidates, Forschungszentrum Jülich in Nordrhein-Westphalia and Halle-Leipzig, and two English candidates, Yorkshire and Oxfordshire.
Regional scepticism
However, after the German Science Council in 2002 as part of a comparative study of nine large-scale research facilities concluded that the ESS project lacked scientific credibility and asked the ESS Council to prepare a new project proposal (2), the German government withdrew its support for the two German site candidates. At the same time, the British government decided to upgrade an already existing neutron-scattering facility - the ISIS neutron source at the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory near Oxford – whereby the two English candidates were eliminated from the race (3).
With its two German and two English competitors effectively out of the competition, ESS Scandinavia was expected to launch a successful campaign to get the project to Sweden, but the venture quickly ran into trouble. In May 2003, Lund municipality put pressure on the Swedish government by signalling that it would abandon ESS, if the government did not involve itself in promoting the project (4). However, when the Swedish government, which perceived the project as a Pan-Scandinavian initiative, approached the Danish government, it received a chilly answer (5). The reason is probably that the Danish Minister of Science, Technology and Research, Helge Sander, had estimated that only 20 Danish neutron researchers could apply ESS in their research (6).
Hence, the project was brought to a standstill until the end of 2005, when Allan Larsson, former minister of finance and director general at the EU-Commission, whom the Swedish Government had asked to review the possibility of hosting ESS in Sweden, published a report, endorsing the facility (7). Still, nothing happened for the next year and a half and many expected that the project had suffered a quiet death. But in February 2007, the then Swedish Minister of Education, Lars Leijonborg, unexpectedly announced that the government would actively support the project (8). The announcement was probably triggered by the Spanish October 2006 decision to financially support a Basque ESS candidateship.
Increasing cost levels
Unfortunately, the many unanswered questions that have haunted ESS in the past still linger. And some new have been added, which pertain to the size, the design and the costs of the project. With respect to the cost levels, at least 10 scenarios have been published since the first report on ESS in 1996. These mostly refer to a full ESS implementation, i.e. two target stations and 44 instruments in operation. The current proposal for ESS in Lund is based on only half the original facility, although it is still being marketed as possessing all the qualities of a fully implemented project. That is why the Swedish government has been able to set the construction costs as low as 1.2 billion euros (11 billion SEK) (9). In less than a year this estimate has increased by 15 percent to almost 1.4 billion euros (13 billion SEK), according to ESS Scandinavia itself (10).
However, considering that ESS is a staged project whose level of implementation ultimately depends on its funding prospects and that ESS Scandinavia has never concealed the fact that it opts for full implementation of the project, the description of the cost levels of a fully implemented ESS would still be necessary for a correct picture of the project. This would mean a return to the basic ESS reference design and construction costs set by the ESS organisation (11) at 1.6 billion euros (15 billion SEK), and in case that the construction costs are staged, at 1.7 billion euros (16 billion SEK) at 2000-prices. If an annual inflation rate of 2.5 percent until 2009/2010 – the earliest point of time, at which construction can begin - is included in the assessment, the constructions costs amount to 2-2.1 billion euros (19-20 billion SEK).
These figures do not include cost overruns, which are common in large infrastructure projects (12). ESS possesses all the characteristics of a typical mega-project: Long planning horizons and complex interfaces, a multi-actor process with often conflicting interest regarding decision making, policy and planning, a project scope and ambition level that changes over time and unplanned events that are unaccounted for, leaving budget and other contingencies inadequate. For such projects, misinformation about costs, benefits, and risks is regularly the norm (13).
Many unanswered questions
The lack of transparency with respect to the cost levels of the ESS project is highlighted by a lot of other unanswered important questions. Mainly, what would be the result of a comprehensive social, environmental and economical analysis of yet another accelerator based system in Europe, considering:
The current status of ESS in Lund
A final decision on the financing and the location of the ESS project is expected before the end of 2008. Two recent developments will be important for the future of ESS in Lund and have the potential of either damaging its prospects or increasing the possibility of success significantly: The emergence of two new site candidates that are now cooperating to outcompete the Swedish ESS proposal and the extension of a new invitation to the Danish government to co-host the project (18).
Since the demise of the four German and British ESS candidates, Hungarian and Spanish candidates have emerged. Until recently, ESS Scandinavia was the strong favourite to build the facility, but in January 2008 the competing candidates teamed up and agreed to combine resources and coordinate activities. They could now be on their way to represent a real alternative (19).
Hence, to a large extent ESS Scandinavia’s prospects will depend on whether the Swedish government will be able to build a Scandinavian platform to host the project. These are not necessarily bright. After the Danish government’s first rejection of the invitation to co-host ESS, the Danish Agency for Science Technology and Innovation commissioned a report from Copenhagen Business School (CBS) in order to get a new outlook on ESS in Lund. The report, which was published in April 2005, endorsed the ESS project, claiming that it would be an attractive element in a broader strategy to raise the general level of scientific research in Denmark. In many ways it is similar to the Swedish government’s basis for decision to support the ESS project. However, in May 2007, the report was brought before the Danish Committees on Scientific Dishonesty (DCSD) by Swedish and Danish environmentalists, including a representative of the Swedish Environmental Movement’s Nuclear Waste Secretariat (MILKAS).
The complaint alleged that the report violated the rules of good scientific practice by not mentioning that the German Science Council had questioned the scientific basis of the ESS project and omitted to mention that the ESS facility can be applied to research of transmutation of nuclear waste. Furthermore, it exaggerated the user basis of the ESS project. The two first allegations were uncontested and ESS Scandinavia has later admitted to exaggerating its estimate of the number of annually visiting researchers to ESS in Lund by a factor of 3 (20). In spite of this, the DCSD rejected the complaint after six months of consideration, motivating this seemingly controversial decision by determining that the CBS report was not a work of science (21).
With the ESS report compromised and realising that a far more comprehensive assessment of the ESS project is necessary, the Danish government has now put together a working group consisting of representatives of five Danish ministries, which has been asked to coordinate a report on the perspectives of a possible Danish involvement in the ESS project. The report, which will focus on the environmental, energy and health aspects of ESS in Lund, its research and regional development potential as well as its economy, is expected to be published in March 2008 (22). Although it is perhaps not quite the independent, in-depth analysis of the justification and long-term orientation of the project that green NGOs have asked for for years (23), it is still a big step forward. A rejection of ESS by the Danish government based on a comprehensive analysis of all the aspects of the facility could have serious implications for the ESS project, not only in Lund, but also on the European level.
SOURCES:
(1) European Spallation Source Scandinavia, Expression of interest to host the European Spallation Source in Scandinavia, 2002, p. 11, http://www.ess-scandinavia.org/new/source/dokumentation/ScandinavianEoI.pdf
(2) The German Science Council, European Spallation Source (ESS), Drs. 3753/02, Berlin, 12 July, 2002, p. 40, http://neutron.neutron-eu.net/FILES/Assessment_WR.pdf and The German Science Council, Statement on nine large-scale facilities for basic scientific research and on the development of investment planning for large-scale facilities, Berlin, 12 July 2002, p. 54 and 77, http://www.wissenschaftsrat.de/texte/5385-02.pdf
(3) Nature 422, 17 April 2003.
(4) Sydsvenskan, 21 May 2003, ESS-anläggningen får deadline, http://w1.sydsvenskan.se/Article.jsp?article=10044870
(5) Undated letter from October 2003 from the Danish Minister of Science, Technology and Research, Helge Sander, to the Swedish Minister of Education, Thomas Östros.
(6) Ministeren for videnskab, teknologi og udvikling, Svar på spørgsmål nr. 81(Alm. del – bilag 378) stillet af Udvalget for Videnskab og Teknologi d. 8. oktober 2003,http://www.folketinget.dk/img20031/udvbilag/lib4/20031_1054/20031_1054.pdf
(7) Allan Larsson, Svenskt värdskap för ESS, juni 2005, p. 9-10, http://www.ess-scandinavia.org/new/source/dokumentation/ESSrapportenSlutligVersion22Juni2005.pdf
(8) Press release, the Swedish Ministry of Education, 26 February 2007, http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/119/a/77428
(9) E.g. see Svenskt värdskap för ESS, p. 84 and the ESS Scandinavian proposal, p. 2, which states that “ESS Scandinavia proposes that the cost savings on the accelerator is used for increasing the number of instruments. As the number of additional instruments is variable, and all instruments must not be built from day one, the total costs can be made not to exceed those of the basic design”, the “basic design” meaning the design described in the The ESS Project, Volume III Update Report, http://www.essscandinavia.org/new/source/dokumentation/ESSproposal060201.pdf
(10) Letter from ESS Scandinavia to Niels Henrik Hooge, 11 December 2007, http://www.folkkampanjen.se/ess/letter-from-ess-scandinavia20071211.pdf
(11) The ESS Project, Volume III Update Report, Project Schedule, Organisation, Personnel and Costs, 2005, s. 9-1-9-20, http://neutron.neutron-eu.net/FILES/Chapter_9_1_2005.pdf
(12) Bent Flyvbjerg, Megaproject Policy and Planning: Problems, Causes, Cures, Sammenfattende redegørelse for doktorafhandling af Bent Flyvbjerg, Institut for Samfundsudvikling og Planlægning Aalborg Universitet, 2007, http://www.plan.aau.dk/arrangementer/afhandlingBF2007s.pdf
(13) Ibid. p. 2- 4 and 12-14
(14) Mattias Jönsson & Johan Rönmark, European Spallation Source ur ett riskperspektiv, Report 5202, Brandteknik, Lunds tekniska högskola, Lunds universitet, Lund 2006, p. 47-50, http://www.brand.lth.se/bibl/pbr-5202.pdf. The report is financed by Lund Municipality.
(15) The reactor core of Barsebaeck 2 contained 444 fuel assemblies. The fuel weight per assembly was 172 kgU/assembly totalling a weight of 76.4 tons of heavy (uranium) metal (tHM), cf. Barsebäcksoffensivs (BBOFF) høringssvar af 11/6 2004 i forbindelse med Barsebäckværkets ansøgning om miljøgodkendelse, p. 33, http://www.noah.dk/energi/BBOFF.pdf
(16) E.g. see Council of the European Spallation Source Project, Guideline on how to submit an expression of interest to host the European Spallation Source Project, November 2001, p. 12, http://neutron.neutron-eu.net/FILES/site_selection_procedure.pdf, Karin Byman, David Ringmar och Maria Stenkvist – Elförsörjning till European Spallation Source – en forskningsanläggning i Sydsverige, ÅF Energi & Miljö AB, Stockholm 2003-03-03, http://www.ess-scandinavia.org/new/source/Nyheter/AF_ESS_030303.pdf and ÅF-Energi & Miljö AB, Rapport nr SR-ESS 040107, Ekonomisk analys gällande elförsörjningen av European Spallation Source byggd i Lund, Öresundsregionen, Stockholm, 2004-01-07, p. 15, http://www.ess-scandinavia.org/new/source/Nyheter/SR%20ESS%20040107.pdf
(17) http://www.middelgrunden.dk/MG_UK/news/updated_news.htm An electricity need of 40 MW also corresponds to more than 35 per cent of the power capacity of Vattenfall’s Lillgrund offshore wind farm, south of the Øresund Bridge. The Lillgrund offshore wind farm, which is the largest in Sweden has a capacity of 110 MW and is expected to provide electricity to approximately 60.000 Swedish households, cf. http://www.vattenfall.com/www/vf_com/vf_com/365787ourxc/366203opera/555848newpo/557Lillgrund offshore wind farm0Lillgrund offshore wind farm04biofu77761/366331lillg/index.jsp
(18) Bjarke Wiegand, Øresundsregionen som forskermagnet, Ugebrevet Mandag Morgen 41, 26. november 2007
(19) Press release, Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, Spain and Hungary reinforce their candidatures to host the European Spallation Source, 24 January 2008, http://neutron.neutron-eu.net/FILES/Press_ESS_Hungary_Spain.pdf and Sydsvenskan, Konkurrenterna om ESS går samman, 4 februari 2008, http://sydsvenskan.se/lund/article298710.ece
(20 Letter from ESS Scandinavia to Niels Henrik Hooge, 11 December 2007. According to this December 2007 estimate of ESS Scandinavia, the European community of researchers who use neutrons is currently ~4500. Over a 3-year period they are all expected to use ESS. This is crucial new information, considering that ESS Scandinavia routinely has mentioned a figure of 5000 annually visiting researchers, when it defines the user basis of ESS, cf. http://www.skane.se/pages/184248/RTN20070115.2.3.pdf and http://www.skane.se/templates/Page.aspx?id=178956 This figure roughly corresponds to estimates of the entire European neutron scattering community. It also underpins the Swedish government’s decision to financially support ESS in Lund, cf. The Swedish Ministry of Education and Research, Locating the European Spallation Source (ESS) in Sweden, Memorandum, 26 February 2007, p. 2, http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/74/78/062c65e4.doc
(21) Per Hegelund, Bo Wennergren, Roland Rittman, Niels Henrik Hooge, Giv UVVU et stærkere mandat, Information, 8. december 2007, http://www.information.dk/151531
(22) Ministeren for videnskab, teknologi og udvikling, Svar på spørgsmål nr. 16, 17 og 18 (Alm. del) stillet af Udvalget for Videnskab og Teknologi den 18. december 2007, 15. januar 2008, http://www.folketinget.dk/samling/20072/almdel/UVT/spm/16/svar/endeligt/20080115/517718.PDF
(23) The Danish Ecological Council, Press release, 5 December 2002, The organizers’ conclusions and recommendations, http://www.folkkampanjen.se/doc1/ess20021205statement.pdf